

Beyond postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy Toward a Diasporic philosophy of counter-education

Ilan Gur-Ze'ev

Whose violence is it that talks itself through the “authentic I” to us? Whose voice is it that summons “us”, that alerts “us”, that deceives-creates us? What stands behind the back of the endless possibility/unrestrained obligation to ask “who?” or “what?” is the implicit “I” who raise the question as a question of gaze and as a question of audience in terms of voice, agency, meaning, worthy suffering, or true love of Life? Is it possible that the struggle over the essence of feminism, the essence of Judaism, and the possibility of counter-education meet here?

As a sophisticated version of normalizing education, postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy cannot present an alternative to normalizing education (Gur-Ze'ev, 2003, pp. 1-24). And yet, what it would have liked to say is of utmost importance for the possibility of counter-education which will make possible worthy suffering and a kind of homelessness within which meaninglessness injustice and self-forgetfulness will not have the last word. Against its explicit assertions it might contain remnants of a saying, of a strive, of a need, which has not received the space and the power genuinely to express its essence. The truth of its essence remains always beyond the horizons of “its” rhetoric. This wordless truth as readiness, however, might guide us to an ecstatic solidarior refusal of Thanatus as a quest for power as home, to a Diasporic being-in the-world-as-becoming, within which we, yes, you and I, will face the call to responsibility and to the creative potentials of Life, which ultimately is beyond immanence and transcendence.

This is the essence of Judaism, when it is not conceived within an ethnocentrist framework.

Is it possibly worth trying to climb beyond postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy as a way of transcending normalizing education itself? But where is this homelessness? And of what is made such a Diasporic climber? How do we overcome normalizing education as a productive symbolic violence (ibid.), which creates the “not-I” as “I” who is at once the overwhelmed victim and the most faithful agent of normalizing education, and its violences? Maybe we should go to a space where the violence of normalizing education is most subtle, where critical education has seemingly progressed most, in order to address these challenges? What is, however, this "normalizing education", that postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy is supposed to be – or is actually - the overcoming realization of its concealed exile?

Normalizing education is one of the manifestations of the creative power of metaphysical violence (Gur-Ze'ev 2001, 315-336). It is an ontological sign. It is concealed as a contextualized undeciphered power-game and represented as a historical or as a material dimension, which becomes "real" and visible within the context of today's Western rhetoric and practices. Western philosophical foundations, modern technology, and current capitalist practices are the preconditions for its concealment as visible, detectable, reality. These conditions are responsible for its forgetfulness of its forgetfulness as it receives a name, becomes a sign whose existence, effects, creation, and destruction are acknowledged. The given gaze and the legitimate listening as a matrix conceal not only open possibilities for getting close to the essence of the truth of becoming, they conceal the very possibility of the possibility itself, by the way in which

it represents openness, creation, and growth. Central to the self-forgetfulness here is the concept and the psychological constitution of an instrumental-oriented dwelling-in-reality. This kind of dwelling is realized also in Western philosophy itself. This concept of philosophy, which was dominated by the Platonic quest for light and love of truth, is far from being at peace with itself and is embarrassed; it feels guilty at the present historical moment (Levinas, 1996, p. 163). Maybe Judaism may help us here to liberate ourselves from the cave of Western philosophy and existence.

Levinas does not explicitly say it but he implies that actually there exists a resemblance between the quest for the Platonic light and the violence which governs/constitutes Western reality. Postcolonialist thinkers implement this concept of Levinas and Derrida for re-reading the direct and symbolic violence and counter-violence between Western colonialism and its marginalized cultures in the third world and within the Western realm itself (Chambers 1996, p. 209).

The division between truth and violence provides the unification of peace and truth, worthy education, and love. In parallel it provides a conception of the essence of the human being and an appropriate ethics. The philosophies of Foucault, Lyotard, and Deleuze are a serious challenge to this project. According to Foucault "...one's point of reference should not be to the great model of language and signs, but to that of war and battle. The history, which bears and determines us, has the form of war rather than that of language: relations of power, not relations of meaning" (Foucault 1980, 114).

Within the Foucaultian project the various versions of education do not differ in their central "essence" as normalizing power, and the educational regime does not differ from any other regime of truth which produces subjects, knowledge, and values within a

history which has no "meaning". Like all others, this regime too should be subject to analysis not in accordance with good intentions, "truth", and a natural or sacred "faith in the human" or God, but "in accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and tactics" without "evading the always open and hazardous reality of conflict", without "avoiding its violent, bloody and lethal character by reducing it to the calm Platonic form of language and dialogue" (Foucault, p. 115). Foucault emphasizes the productivity of power and represents the subject – be it a "victim" or a "victimizer" – as one of the manifestations of contingent, meaningless, aimless, power-relations. In contrast to the traditional Western concepts of violence, now truth itself "isn't outside power" (Foucault, p. 131).

Foucault deconstructs the quests and the concepts that allow transcendent, orchestrated, essential change by human autonomy or reason. Traditionally the very possibility of transcendence made reflection possible. It also allowed a concept of a difference, which makes a difference of the kind that "peace" is supposed to be in relation to "war". He considers naive people who refuse to accept the omnipotence of epistemic violence, namely that there is no difference that makes a difference (Foucault 1995, 210-211). In human's life ontological violence is realized in various dimensions and levels: as symbolic violence, as structural violence, and as direct violence which becomes visible and threatens directly the self or the Other as "criminal acts", "military operations", and so forth. Here there is no room for love, for transcendence, for counter-education, yet there is much room for manipulating the quest for love and the need for transcendence under very different flags, such as "love of the motherland", "the voice of God", "the imperatives of reason", or "critical theory".

In all of its versions, normalizing education is responsible for constituting the “I” as a “not-I”. Namely, constructing the I as some-thing and not as some-one – as a particle of the collective or as the humble slave of “the truth”, “the justice”, or “beauty”. The “I” becomes an object of manipulations, the locus of violent body politics, of symbolic and social reproduction and a site of camouflaging the manners by which the system hides its violent reproduction of the hegemonic order of things and the governing realm of self-evidence (Gur-Ze’ev 2003).

In other words, under these conditions the human subject is an effect, a construct, an echo, and sometime the veil that conceals the logic of the system of which it is a part. The subject is being constructed and is dragged into or allowed a position (even when re-positioning herself, or when rebelling). At the same time the subject is a function in the discourse whose very existence is depended on, which is always contextual, historical, material preconditions, practices, manifestations, and effects. As such, the human subject is both the victim of the system and its most devoted agent.

The human subject, however, as a potential, is infinitely more than, and different from what she is determined to become by contingent power-relations, by the individual and collective drives, imperatives of the historical moment, and the creative reactions to the possibilities imposed by Fortuna. Love enables becoming. It presumes the otherness and the truth of the mission in face of which one can rightly reply to the question “who” and seriously say “It’s me!” The issue of the serious response to a genuine call which addresses me is what makes the difference. “Once we are so related and drawn to what withdraws, we are drawing into what withdraws, into the enigmatic and therefore mutable nearness of its appeal. Whenever man is properly drawing that way, he is thinking – even

though he may still be away from what withdraws, even though the withdrawal may remain as veiled as ever” (Heidegger 1996, pp. 381-382). And only in this love of the truth and the love of the otherness of the other and of the self Love becomes a possible gate for learning. Learning to listen, properly to prepare oneself for seriousness of the kind we lost begins, paralleling dislearning and “mak[ing] everything we do answer to whatever addresses itself to us as essential” (Heidegger 1996, p. 373). Such a possibility is never given, is always beyond our reach. Its possibility signifies the possibility of transcending dogma, overcoming ethnocentrism, and resisting the fear of the infinite otherness of the Other. It signifies the potential of becoming a human subject, a creative love.

This potential of becoming a human subject signifies the potential burst of "the totally other", of transcendence from the seeming omnipotence of the given "facts", "pre-conditions and the syntax of the discourse", namely, overcomes what Benjamin calls “now-time” in response to the “Messianic time”. In Benjamin’s thought, as in traditional Judaism, "the messianic time"(Benjamin 1974, pp. 703) bursts into the "now-time."(ibid., p. 701), momentarily penetrates the continuity of the vain progress of catastrophic time and creates in it a special extra-temporal point, at which time ceases to flow and a redeemed space of time is constituted, and at which it is possible to try to call things by their true name and to fight the "evil" celebrating its victory. The struggle for knowledge turns out to be a moral struggle for the good life by an isolated, Diasporic, individual, who at most can hope to break the continuum which in principle is always victorious, and to which historical "progress" has been handed over ever since the "first sin".

The tension between these two poles is the gate to the abyss of human destiny. Only as

such does it open the gate for a Diasporic existence, which acknowledges homelessness, affirms meaninglessness, and does not try to escape fear, pain, and hatred.

All these are not challenged by the various versions of radical education, and even the hegemonic version of Critical Pedagogy fails here. Why is this so? It is because Critical Pedagogy too refuses Diasporic philosophy and calls for “returning home” or for the erection of a new “home” – in the form of a collective, as a solipsistic-oriented existence, or as a dogma. It refuses existential, philosophical, and political homelessness, homelessness which, at the same time, resists actual injustice, devotes itself to gazing at that which enables transcendence of the “ethical I” (Levinas 1987, pp. 185-186) at the truth, and at Diasporic Messianism-without-a-Messiah.

Normalizing education is realized in the process of subjectification as a process of fabricating the "I" as a productive fiction.

For all their importance, the critical pedagogies of Paulo Freire, Ira Shor, Kathleen Weiler, Henry Giroux, Peter McLaren, Douglas Kellner, and bell hooks are not exceptional in this matter. What is the secret of the seeming omnipotence of normalizing education, which enables it to govern even postmodern Critical Pedagogy, and even postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy in its most advanced forms (some of which become post-critical and post-feminist)?

Here we have to consider the function of normalizing education, and we cannot make do with reconstructing its content within specific contexts since what is of utmost importance here is the creativity of its violence, even in terms of openness, difference, drives, aesthetics, responsibility, and rationality.

Normalizing education is not content solely with the introduction of a certain set of

values as worthy and relevant. It naturalizes their contingent representation as worthy, relevant, and valid as well as the untruth, danger, or irrelevancy of their Others.

Normalizing education, however, does more than that in introducing the yardstick to evaluate conflicting sets of values as self-evident as part of the subjectification of the subject. Namely, as part of the production of the self-identity of the human subject as self-evident, as a center for reflection and moral judgments for the “not-I”, as a realization of the “I” (Gur-Ze’ev 2001a, 91-155).

Normalizing education must integrate a specific conceptual apparatus into a specific set of values (Gur-Ze'ev 2003, p. 8). Concepts such as “equality” and values such as “freedom” are not natural, authentic, or original – they are fabricated. They are produced at a specific historical moment in a concrete material and symbolic setting, which they serve and represent. The veil of Being is woven every moment anew. Its eternal repetition is made possible even by the effort to overcome the gap between the human and Western mission of philosophy: the world is being deciphered, interpreted, manipulated and re-represented - never without the agency of concepts. Within almighty dynamic symbolic creation concepts, rules, and relations, which are enforced by normalizing education, create/decipher “reality” or “representations” into a Maya curtain. The self-evidence, not only the horizons of critical reason, moral coexistence, and estrangement from nature, veils the possibility of facing the violence, which establishes unsatisfied drives, concepts, and values such as “freedom”. It establishes specific concepts and not others as relevant, true, or possible. This introduction, or enforcement, of a specific set of concepts - without revealing its blind interests and pre-constituted games –is one of the manifestations of metaphysical violence. Here it is realized as

epistemic violence. Normalizing education is possible only as a result of its huge, creative, success (Gur-Ze'ev 1999a).

Epistemic violence (Foucault 1965, 261-262) is a precondition for the explicit, unmediated use of violence, which as such is granted a name and is addressed as a "conflict" or a "violence". It is realized in the formation of conceptual apparatuses, knowledge, consciousness, ideological orientations, and consensus or self-evidence. It establishes the "we", the "they", and the relevant ideology of redeeming/educating/exiling/destroying/re-educating the Other so that there will be no room for the otherness of the Other and the Otherness of the "I" as potentially different from what she is directed to become.

Normalizing education is responsible not solely for constituting the "subject". It realizes itself also in introducing to the subject certain bodies of knowledge and representing others as irrelevant and illegitimate. Still others are lost, destroyed, or swallowed by the new system. It also expels certain "dangerous"/"foreign" sets of values, making others forgotten, irrelevant, or illegitimate in a process which at the same time imposes a certain evaluation apparatus that is immanent to the hegemonic order. The stability of the hegemonic realm of self-evidence and the identification with the system are very much dependent on this evaluation apparatus. Only in face of the given horizons and the given scarce, pains, codes, and pleasures – as well as in face of their silenced alternatives and transformations one evaluates one's own values. It is also the never totally controlled arena where she evaluates the values of the Other, and where the faith of alternative knowledge is predestined even in a supposedly free and Critical Pedagogy dialogues. The self-evidence of the apparatus which evaluates the values of the "we" and

the values of the Other, as well as alternative concepts of knowledge, and not solely a certain tradition or knowledge, ensures the hegemonic order of things. It vaccinates the hegemonic reality against a potential critique that will decipher its violences and its aimlessness, and will undermine the justifications, inevitability, and self-evidence of the present order of things. As the historical estrangement/enrichment between the tradition of objective reason and instrumental rationality is coming to an end with the total victory of instrumental rationality, rationality itself becomes irrational omnipotence, a fierce enemy of human multi-dimensional edification. "Critique" itself becomes part and parcel of the order it is supposed to challenge (Horkheimer, 511, VII3). This process is part of a larger process within which the logic of the hegemonic actuality is produced, represented, distributed, consumed, and re-produced.

This process cannot be separated from the process of subjectification. Here the subject is fabricated as a productive fiction. The subjectivity is produced as part of the Same, as a thing, as part of the continuum of the reality governed by instrumental rationality.

Normalizing education realizes here its mission to de-humanize the human subject and produce her as an object of manipulations (Gur-Ze'ev 2003, p. 2). And yet, it cannot avoid endangering her self-forgetfulness; by that it exposes itself to human awakening and to the challenge of counter-education. Within this process the subject is deprived of her otherness, she forgets her potential readiness to be called upon, and instead, she is granted the possibility to develop "her" subjectivity. She is constructed in a manner which will conceal from her that "her" subjectivity is nothing more than another manifestation of the logic of the system within which she is produced, nourished, controlled, and robbed of her otherness, of her potential to become other than what she is

directed to become. Normalizing education, in this sense, dehumanizes the human so that she will become an aspect, an echo, a product of the context, which produces her both as a victim and as an enthusiastic agent of the process of her victimization/de-humanization. Only in such a world is there room for love, worthy suffering, and critique. The critique of postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy unconceals, with special clarity, the secret of normalizing education as concealment, and the uncovering of this secret as another veil whose unveiling might open the question of the Diasporic human destiny.

Current postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy is at a crossroad. Its embarrassment is only a fraction of the more general crisis of current postmodern feminist pedagogy, which in turn is but an aspect of the more general problematics of today's feminist theory and practice in an era of a grand historical shift.

Given the complexity of this crisis, "feminist teaching and pedagogy are, likewise, interpreted in many different ways by those who name themselves as feminist educators" (Brady and Dentith 2001, 165). In such a reality we are faced with an opportunity to search for possible articulations of a Diasporic philosophy of education, which will give birth to a creative counter-education that will address the challenges of the present historical moment.

One major force, which has an important impact on today's postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy, is the post-colonialist ideology, which is influenced heavily by various postmodern discourses. The various versions of Critical Pedagogy, which insist (in different ways and degrees) on the centrality of the Critical Pedagogy theory of the Frankfurt School, will be very careful with the kind and degree of post-colonialist dimensions that they introduce into their concepts of Critical Pedagogy. According to

Giroux, “Paulo Freire’s efforts must be read as a postcolonial text” (Giroux 1994, 142). Others will receive “harder” versions of postmodern philosophy, and accordingly their post-colonialism will be differently integrated into their Critical Pedagogy. Still others will treat differently the post-colonialist ideology and “postmodern philosophy”, and will try not only to go beyond current postmodernism but even to transcend Critical Pedagogy itself. Already at this stage it is important to note that in its radical versions the post-colonialist influence draws Critical Pedagogy into an ethnocentric foundationalist emancipatory commitment, while using post-colonial ideologies, which at the same time are committed to negate ethnocentrism, essentialism, foundationalism, and any sort of universalism . These various receptions of post-colonial ideology have a major impact on postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy.

A different force directs feminist postmodern Critical Pedagogy in the opposite direction: to save some of the Enlightenment’s ideals while criticizing central elements of the present-day postmodern discourse and paying tribute to others. This trend manifests a weaker ethnocentrism than the other, yet it is not entirely cleansed of ethnocentrism or dogmatic anti-“Eurocentrism” or dogmatic anti-“whiteness”. In some aspects it is theoretically weaker than the essentialist and “strong” ethnocentric version of postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy, which negates altogether the humanist emancipatory commitment and stands on the border of negating Critical Pedagogy itself, even in its hegemonic multicultural-race- gender-oriented version. It is manifested so clearly in the Ellsworth-Giroux debate (Lather 1992, pp. 124-126). It seems to me that bell hooks, like Carmen Luke and Jennifer Gore, stands at both poles of this trend, while Ellsworth and Lather stand with the “harder” postmodern version of this kind of feminist Critical

Pedagogy. Other postmodern feminist voices explicitly resist, or deconstruct, the liberatory project altogether, as one can see in the works of Donna Haraway, Sadie Plant, and Zoe Sofoulis (Gur-Ze'ev 1999, pp. 437-455).

Within the framework of cyberfeminism we are faced with a promising development of the post-colonialist feminist critique: a post-feminist messianic project. Its positive utopian educational vision demands our attention, since it offers a serious philosophical, existential, and political challenge to the critical concepts of violence, subject, drives, agency, subject, meaning, creation, and emancipation.

Still other voices are searching for new theoretical, educational, and political beginnings in light of what they see as the apparent failure of modern as well as "postmodern" alternatives to "traditional" drives, concepts, and acts of oppression and emancipation in the works of Deleuze and Lacan. It is a single line stretching from Freire to Deleuze, from Critical Pedagogy to post-critique and post-feminism.

Some of these trends become anti-intellectual and "hard" instrumentalism, some depoliticize theoretical educational discourse, while others offer an explicit, instrumental anti-humanistic-oriented political agenda. Very vivid here is the absence of the presence of a comprehensive critical theory or resistance to a serious philosophical framework (hooks 1994, 69) that will protect all these trends from being drawn into a strategic-instrumentalist orientation, within which there is no room for Life, poesis, or for a modified "home-returning" presence of objective reason, which synthesizes the Dionysian and the Apollonian dimensions of human creativity. In the absence of anti-instrumentalist vital responsibility and in face of the implicit or explicit abandoning of critical theory's dialogical, solidaristic, and transcendental dimensions, all these trends,

with all their differences, are in danger of becoming a precious ornamentation of the sublime violence of the postmodern condition (Gur-Ze'ev 1999, 451). As such their potential to contribute to the advance of emancipatory counter-education is severely affected.

Postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy, however, does have many critical and potentially emancipatory elements. It is a genuine political and philosophical challenge to Western hegemonic educational ideologies. It questions educational praxis as well as the educator's philosophical, psychological, and gender contexts. The differences between the various feminist philosophies have, however, left their mark on the various feminist pedagogies, their challenges, and their disagreements and rivalries. Basically, these differences spring from the different postmodern versions they are committed to. We can categorize them as "hard" and "soft" postmodernisms.

The "hard" and "soft" postmodern positions will give birth to feminist and post-feminist pedagogies, on the one hand, and to different versions of postmodern feminist critical and post-Critical Pedagogy, on the other. Both versions, however, fail to offer a worthy counter-education within which the truth of the essence of feminism and the telos of the critical Spirit will be addressed. Ultimately, both of them are part and parcel of normalizing education.

According to Kathleen Weiler, "Feminist theory, like other contemporary approaches, validates differences, challenges universal claims to truth, and seeks to create social transformation in a world of shifting and uncertain meanings. In education, these profound shifts are evident on two levels: first, at the level of practice, as excluded and formerly silenced groups challenge dominant approaches of learning and definitions of

knowledge; and second, at the level of theory, as modernist claims to universal truth are called into question” (Weiler 1991, 449-450).

According to bell hooks, postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy employs pedagogical strategies that “create ruptures in the established order, that promote modes of learning which challenge bourgeois hegemony” (hooks 1994, 185); here she explicitly insists that there is no genuine conflict between Critical Pedagogy and feminist philosophy and pedagogy. As we shall see later, this is quite a problematic and controversial issue for other postmodern feminist thinkers.

According to hooks claims that “Feminist and Critical Pedagogy are two alternative paradigms for teaching which have really emphasized the issue of coming to voice. That focus emerged as central, precisely because it was so evident that race, sex, and class privilege empower some students more than others, granting ‘authority’ to some voices more than others” (ibid.).

Jeanne Brady and Audrey Dentith define “a critical postmodern feminism as a theory of pedagogy that provides the needed space to embrace the multiple positions required for democratic participation. They write: “We purposely use a Critical Pedagogy discourse to safeguard the political intentions of feminism which can be compromised by an emphasis on postmodernism....It represents a politics of social change in which people participate in the shaping of the theories and practices of liberation” (Brady and Dentith 2001, p. 166). This postmodern alternative to the emancipatory Critical Pedagogy tradition is not to be seen solely in explicit postmodern feminist and post-feminist alternatives such as that of Haraway and Ellsworth: it is even manifested in some of the attempts to integrate postmodern and Enlightened emancipatory potentials, like in the

project of Carmen Luke and Jennifer Gore, in their *Feminisms and Critical Pedagogy* (Luke and Gore 1990), which is explicitly aimed at constructing “a politics of emancipation through resistance to all “phallogentric knowledge” (Luke 1996, 283).

As Patti Lather notes (Lather 1992, p. 132) postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy, or maybe we should call it post-critical feminist pedagogy, tries to present itself as a radical emancipatory element within the current realm of self-evidence. Such an approach, however, might become a serious challenge as it offers us an alternative to the Frankfurt School critical theory, or an alternative to present-day comprehensive critical theory, which will address key concepts such as education and violence, the powers that produce, control, and challenge this totality. It is in great need of an articulated orientation to relate to the aims, preconditions, context, and practices of intersubjectivity whereby the feminist movement, in all its versions, is but a dynamic element within other powers.

The refusal/failure to offer a comprehensive critical theory, or alternatively to constitute a defensible theory or an alternative, creative, quest for overcoming the pursuit of a comprehensive inter-disciplinary and holistic critical theory as part of reality and its change, is very significant for today’s feminist Critical Pedagogy. This is because it identifies “phallogentrism” with grand narratives, universal values and theories, foundationalism, and essentialism. Here we are confronted with an issue which might become a bridge but currently is much more of an abyss: how to integrate the tension between the modernistic-oriented destiny in respect of meaning, solidarity, justice, emancipation, agency – and postmodern sensitivities, treatment of discourse and existence, and way of life. Whither can we proceed from the rich tension between the celebrated postmodern nomadism and a genuine Diasporic philosophy? How can we

overcome the gap between a positive Utopia, even when camouflaged as “hybrid, kaleidoscopic creative amalgamation between/through differences” and the Messianic impulse of negative utopia? Would it help the kind of religiousness which might be given birth from the depth of the abyss which exists between the “ethical I” – who is pre-rational and exterior to the political dimensions of life– and “the moral I” – who has to decide among various alternatives and desires in the kingdom of scarce and conflicting political obligations? Even here, confronting the crucial part of the theoretical, existential, and political chain of postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy, we are not faced with “the reply” to this challenge. This should not surprise nor discourage the Diasporic among us. But should we accept that even the courage, the responsibility, and the eros which will address this challenge are still beyond our horizons? The feminist response to the violence of normalizing education and to the possibility of counter-education is a critical question. It relates to the possibility of critique as transcendence and to the possibility of going beyond the omnipotence of the immanence of “the system” and the “transcendence” of the subject, who is currently so embarrassed in face of its subjectification.

Today’s feminism is embarrassed theoretically and politically by questions such as “Who/what talks itself through ‘me’”? “What enables me to respond ‘I am’ when called upon?” Or, “how do I critically address the issue of being a mere echo of the order of things, which normalizes me, and constitutes even the yardsticks by which I will evaluate and reflect on “my” and “foreign” values, codes, and apparatuses, which determine the horizons even of my resistance, refusal, and destruction?”

According to Luke and Gore, the aim of feminist Critical Pedagogy is to constitute

daily pedagogical situations that empower students, to demystify canonical knowledge, and to show the ways in which relations of domination oppress the subjects in terms of gender, race, class, and many other characteristics of their difference (Luke and Gore 1992, 1).

According to Weiler, Critical Pedagogy in general, and Freire's version in particular, is based on a vision of social transformation. Feminist pedagogy is presented within this framework, and it also shares the assumptions about oppression and the possibilities of historical change. Implicitly negating Marx's theory on the relations between base and superstructure, Weiler claims that the two pedagogies share an assumption that human existence, in specific material conditions, is framed within repressive conditions, which are part of consciousness; both pedagogies understand consciousness as something which is more than the sum of dominant discourses. Both view consciousness as having a critical potential, and both conceive human beings as subjects and as functioning within historical horizons. At the same time, both are committed to a vision of emancipatory possibilities, to a better world where justice prevails in the end (Weiler 1991, 450).

Within the framework of feminist pedagogy, some emphasize the differences between feminist pedagogy and Critical Pedagogy to the point of complete detachment, and some try to maintain some of its central elements even within the framework of postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy.

The critique of critical theory and "paternalistic" Critical Pedagogy takes place on two levels, the political and the philosophical. Oppositional stands on the political level largely incubate and obscure basic agreement with the philosophical conceptions of critical theory. By contrast, relatively minor disagreements on the political level

sometimes hide commitments to basically different philosophical projects.

Elizabeth Ellsworth, a central figure of postmodern feminist pedagogy, started her project from within critical education (Ellsworth 1987, 33). She criticizes Critical Pedagogy with a postmodern rhetoric and negates critical theory and the “arrogance” of the Enlightenment’s entire emancipatory project. Ellsworth’s negation of metaphysics, foundationalism, and metanarratives amounts to anti-intellectualism and abandonment of every speculative, comprehensive, or even holistic theory. In this she represents postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy’s abandonment of the Critical Pedagogy spirit and its struggle for human emancipation. No wonder Ellsworth founds her critique on her “private experience”. Here “experience”, “personal-ness” or “subjectivity” and its drives become an alternative to the reflective mind. But what kind of “experience” we are faced with here, when addressing the questions of the “not- I” constituting itself as the matrix of the postmodern “I” who “experiences”-“creates”-“deconstructs”-“plays” “her” self? Is it a Dionysian will to power that experiences its generous creative powers? Or is it an echo of a very different kind, which represent an opposite movement, away from Life into another flat, mechanistic, anti-vitalist dynamism, whose *Danse Macabre* is activated by the music of Thanatus and decadence while singing the words of eros and unlimited creation/deconstruction? There is no renaissance here for the Nietzschean tension of self-creativity and destiny, on the one hand, nor for the issues of subjectification and the omnipotence of the symbolic dynamics which govern the discourse, on the other.

To my mind, Ellsworth pretends to liberate the feminist educational project from a defined theoretical stand, but she inevitably enslaves the emancipatory spirit to dogmatic essentialist symbolic contingencies that determine the discourse, to solipsism, and to

ethnocentrism. She dismisses any theory that is rationally dependable and exposed to the sort of critique that modern patriarchy constructed as elitist Western knowledge, which was manifested, tested, or realized violently within the idealist framework or materialist, human, class, national, or other emancipatory project. This critique, which also refers to the horizons, orientations, and foundations of technological and scientific developments, is of much relevance, and targets some of the basic problems of Critical Pedagogy. It does so, however, in a way which is philosophically wrong and politically dangerous.

Ellsworth attacks the nativity of Critical Pedagogy's concept of dialogue. She emphasizes its repressive-paternalistic dimensions, as manifested in the critical pedagogies of Freire, McLaren, Shor, and Giroux. She forgets that when it comes to the Enlightenment's ideals and their influence on the orchestration of critical pedagogies they are influenced by the Frankfurt School's critical theory in its first stage of development. At that early stage of the intellectual development the Frankfurt School thinkers they were still committed to positive utopianism and were thus potentially repressive. Ellsworth criticizes, for example, Giroux's concept of dialogue in the classroom, where students are supposed to manifest "trust, partnership and commitment to develop human conditions" (Giroux 1988, 72).

An important element in Giroux's thesis is that the specific assertions of his positive utopianism are not predetermined. However, even by his thesis the partners of the dialogue must be able to agree on the purpose, limits, and regulations for change and for constituting a consensus concerning the dialogue. According to his scheme, all voices and differences are united in their efforts to form a worthy dialogical existence and to

challenge certain moments of human suffering. As such they are also obliged to overcome the conditions that reproduce this kind of suffering (Giroux 1988, 72).

Ellsworth denounces the illusion of such a dialogue and challenges the oppressive potential of the “we” that is supposed to be a precondition for the revolt of the oppressed, as characterized by Giroux and the other patriarchs of Critical Pedagogy (Ellsworth 1989, 315). Following Judith Butler, Ellsworth emphasizes the omnipotence of social and cultural manipulations of the consciousness, and the effects of its theories about the world and about the self. However, if the subject is totally constructed (Butler 1993, p. 124), there is no way for the human subject genuinely to escape manipulations, criticize and refuse injustice, or even partially constitute her identity, and certainly it is impossible genuinely to change the rules/codes/telos/effects of the discourse or social reality for the better. This is where this trend, represented by Ellsworth’s postmodernism, differs from the other trend, represented by Weiler, who shares with Freire and other Critical Pedagogy thinkers the Enlightenment’s concept of the autonomy and reflective potential of men and women in their communities: “Thus, like Freirean pedagogy, feminist pedagogy is grounded in the vision of social change. And like Freirean pedagogy, feminist pedagogy rests on truth claims of the primacy of experience and consciousness that are grounded in historically situated social change movements” (Weiler 1991, 456). The important issue here, however, is that within the postmodern setting of both trends in present-day feminist pedagogy there is no way of challenging the “experience” of the subjectified “subject” within the omnipotence of the discourse, and the tyranny of all-penetrating power-relations/games in the “world” as a metaphor for intersubjectivity in given conditions that have to be critically reconstructed, developed, and rationally

changed as part of an ongoing creative dialogue. This is a positive and abstract Utopia. It is negated by Life every moment anew in a capitalist society. The capitalist moment, however, is only signaling the concealment of Being.

The retreat into the rhetoric of the omnipotence of the matrix or into celebrating being drawn into the pleasure machine or into simplistic “resistance” and “transformation” are part of this veil. The flight from existential, theoretical, and political acknowledgement and from a Diasporic nomadic existence in always broken manifestations of the totality of Being is not a way of saving individuality but the opposite; it surrenders the eros, the quest, and actualization of the human potential for autonomy, responsibility, and happiness in face of worthy suffering as a Diasporic coming-into-being. By so doing this project abandons human need and the human potential for non-violent edifying intersubjectivity and for transcending the self-evidence, which is also the omnipotent matrix. As such it opposes the essence of feminism when it is true to itself.

Like many other radical feminists of the last decade, following Michel Foucault Ellsworth tries to avoid being committed to a project that is devoted “to control justice and truth”, as part of a non-hierarchical feminist alternative to the elitism and the immanent violence of the modern patriarchal rationalistic emancipatory project. As a realization of this alternative, Ellsworth’s feminist pedagogy suggests “a politics of partial narratives” (Ellsworth 1989, 303), and it is of vital importance for her to separate her feminist pedagogy from Critical Pedagogy (ibid., 116). Even Critical Pedagogy’s attempt to proceed from Marcuse’s ontological and epistemological universal assumptions and obligations to more modest assumptions, like Habermas’s ambition to develop the critical discursive abilities of the speech community (Habermas 1981), as

pedagogically presented in the Critical Pedagogy of Stanley Aronowitz, Wolfgang Klafki, and others, is denounced and negated. Habermas's aim is to synthesize subjectivity and intersubjectivity, *Zwekrationalitaet* and *Vertrationalitaet*, which brings him to the point of representing himself as the one to develop and correct the "old critical theory" (Habermas 1981, 562). Perhaps this is the reason for blaming him for offering a project which is committed to silencing the different "voices" of the students (Ellsworth 1989, 304), which come from different cultural, gender, or racial backgrounds.

However, Ellsworth's attempt to escape what she conceives as the immanent violence of every "theory", and her attempt to find rescue in the safe haven of her "experience", the self-evidence of the oppressed, or impotent nihilism, is far from offering anti-elitism or any genuine new vitalist alternative spiritual power. On the contrary, this stand is to be understood as the manifestation of the power dynamics and the conceptual limitations of the system against which this postmodern feminist pedagogy is supposed to rebel. Such a politically correct response to celebrated postmodern rhetoric does not represent a new spirit. It does not open a space for a new hermeneutics of the individual or the collective. Nor does it offer a new, courageous, beginning for the struggle against the mystifications of the hegemonic power-relations in the present realm of self-evidence. Ellsworth's alternative has no room for struggle for more equality, justice, freedom, and understanding. Love, beauty, justice, and happiness become unreachable as irrelevant insofar as they do not constitute space for anti-collectivism and for the free human spirit. Nor does her alternative offer the impetus and the guidance for transcendence from a too comfortable human dwelling in the meaninglessness of the established matrix as sweet "home". It does not seek human solidarity or other dimensions of negative utopianism

that condition the type of dialogue representing the “heavenly eros” of Plato or the “negative imagination” of Adorno and the humanist tradition at its best. And it certainly does not prepare its students to face the culture war in an era when capitalism is ready as ever to crush every challenge – while losing all traditional orientations; this is also an era when the enemies of democracy are ready to destroy all humanity and to redeem themselves as *shahids* with no hesitation or fear. For this tradition, universalism, emancipation, and comprehensive theory where unsupported by individualism within non-repressive intersubjectivity that constitutes, and constantly reformulates and transcends, the individuals’ potentialities and realities.

The negative impulse of the dialogue is part of ontological homelessness which enables a Diasporic existence, creation, and improvisation. It offers a non-ethnocentric-oriented human solidarity, and as such it refuses violence, even in the form of counter-violence. It acquires meaning only by realizing itself reflectively, aesthetically, ethically, physically, and pragmatically. Foucault, Lyotard, Guattari, and Deleuze, whose influence on postmodern feminist pedagogy is important, themselves represent a position which to an untrained or disoriented ear might sound quite similar.

According to Deleuze, “We had no taste for abstractions, Unity, Totality, Reason, Subject. We set ourselves the task of analyzing mixed forms, arrangements, what Foucault called apparatuses... We weren’t looking for origins, even lost or deleted ones, but setting out to catch things where they were at work, in the middle” (Deleuze 1995, p. 86). Post-Critical Pedagogy abandons the Critical Pedagogy impulse, with its denunciation of intellectualism, universalism, and “metaphysics”. This trend is brilliantly advocated by Patti Lather.

In face of recent attempts to re-articulate Critical Pedagogy, to which *Educational Theory* has devoted a special issue, Lather offers the “hard” postmodern rhetoric on the ground that such attempts are “a boy thing”. When she refers specifically to the two oppositional attempts to reconstruct Critical Pedagogy she explains that “this is due not so much to the two lead authors being male as it is to the way in which both essays exhibit the masculinist voice of abstraction and universalism, assuming the rhetorical position of ‘the one who knows’, what Ellsworth calls ‘the One with the ‘Right’ Story’” (Lather 1998, p. 488).

Lather offers an alternative, namely to “salvage praxis in a post-Marxist time... Rather than the ‘one right story,’ what I propose in Jones’s subversive repetition of the ruins of Critical Pedagogy is a knowing with/in our doing, what Derrida terms ‘to do and to make come about, as well as to let come (about)’” (Lather, *ibid.*, p. 494).

It is difficult to draw a sharp distinction between this feminist pedagogy and other feminist pedagogies that conceive themselves as being within the framework of Critical Pedagogy. They too are trying to develop an anti-elitist anti-Western colonialist pedagogical practice, founded on the “voice” and the self-evident knowledge of the oppressed collectives, emphasizing their ethnic, cultural, race, class, and sexual uniqueness as a source for worthier interests, superior perspectives, and preferable strives and codes which collide with those of the colonialist-oriented West. The silenced voice that is here conceived as deserving legitimacy and empowerment is uncritically assumed to evolve into a manifestation of legitimate alternative life possibilities, and already as such contains real emancipatory dimensions.

It is very surprising that within the framework of postmodern feminist Critical

Pedagogy this potential is not realized. This is because in this version of postmodernism the emancipatory impulse is drawn into an automatic resistance to genuine reflection and self-critique.

Feminist Critical Pedagogy, however, is intellectually restless on this point. As critical theory's rebellious pupils, these thinkers are explicitly still committed to reflection and to critique, and as postmodernists they are bona fide elitists. This raises the problematic of the position of the intellectual and her authority within the framework of feminist pedagogy. While paying tribute to the experience and the knowledge of the oppressed reassures the supremacy of the (feminist) intellectual as an educator, "feminist educators like Fischer and Bunch accept their authority as intellectuals and theorists, but they consciously attempt to construct their pedagogy to recognize and encourage the capacity of their students to theorize and to recognize their own power" (Weiler 1991, 462). In this sense there is no difference between the "paternalistic"/"authoritative" dimensions of Freire's Critical Pedagogy and those of feminist Critical Pedagogy. The foundation of the authority claimed here is the good intentions of the feminist intellectual. What a problematic justification! Other feminists question this position as "simply a patriarchal mode of gaining and maintaining power, a way of negating women's everyday experience, a means of separating some women from the rest..." (Fischer 1984, 202).

The political resemblance between this feminist Critical Pedagogy and the rhetoric of postmodern post-critical feminist pedagogy enables the latter, as in the case of Ellsworth, to take advantage of the former. The important educational work of feminist Critical Pedagogy, which is represented by women like Gore, Kohli, Luke, and Weiler (that is, explicitly anti-elitist and non-academic), is ultimately forced to serve the academic

success of the feminist elitism that Ellsworth represents. In representing an elitist alternative, Ellsworth does not offer an alternative to naive positive utopianism or any alternative educational theory (Burbules and Rice 1991, 399).

Ellsworth suggests a feminist-oriented post-colonialism that demands/envision the peaceful coexistence of different communities and identities which are committed to and constituted by different knowledge, criteria to judge knowledge, interests, and goals. Within her proposed framework the different bodies of knowledge and the different conceptions about knowledge are all conceived as legitimate and incommensurable, and there is no way to evaluate one or some of them as better, valid, or invalid. The aim of education, according to Ellsworth, should be the nurturing of competence for cooperation across differences that will constitute temporary, local, and partial agreements for the sake of “the common good”.

On the one hand the postcolonialist vision of dialogue within/across/between cultural differences falls ultimately into a reversed ethnocentrism enhanced by the marginalized. The discourse of “difference” becomes a safe haven for an automatic justification of its “internal” and “external” symbolic and direct violences. It is actually but another version of normalizing education. On the other hand, dialogue, transcendence, and love are abandoned in favor of the deconstructed subjectivity and fluid exchange/recycling of “identities” which are but manifestations of the laws and dynamics of the various normalizing apparatuses. On both fronts this ideology does not challenge the logic or the actual practices of capitalism. This is since it is but one of the products and manifestations of the current capitalist mode of cultural production itself.

Ellsworth’s project signifies a reality that cannot guarantee the success of

deconstructing universals as long as suffering, meaninglessness, and the capitalist presence are determining discourses, existential possibilities, and material realities. At the same time, the celebrated praise of the local, partial, and temporary can only be victorious in the form of dissolving the very categories of “woman”, “emancipation”, “meaning”, and “love”.

Within the framework of this project, “woman” as a category and as a specific and concrete identity might disintegrate into innumerable identities, interests, and knowledge that will strive fully to realize themselves. They might be objects for endless deconstruction and border-crossings of identities that are never within themselves, never have a “self”, never are a concrete “identity” or subject. Linda Alcoff admits this danger of extreme deconstruction of essences and identities for unrepressed feminism, and she looks for a Foucaultian philosophical and political solution within the framework of “cultural feminism” (Alcoff 1988, 406), which has important educational potential that should have attracted more attention within postmodern feminist pedagogy. As Seyla Benhabib observes, the “strong” postmodernist version of the “Death of the Subject” is not compatible even with the goals of feminism (Benhabib 1995, p. 20). Benhabib’s claim is valid against postmodern feminism as reflected in Ellsworth’s postmodern post-critical feminist pedagogy when she asserts-asks: “If this view of the self is adopted, is there any possibility of changing those ‘expressions’ which constitute us?” (Benhabib 1995, p. 21). Therefore she negates postmodern feminism’s understanding of subjectivity as merely extensions of our histories on the one hand, and the postmodern essentialism in its multicultural and solipsist versions on the other. While accepting parts of the postmodern critique of humanist universalism (Benhabib 1992, p. 3), as a woman

committed to feminist and human emancipation in general Benhabib resists the attempts to abandon the Enlightenment's Utopia of human emancipation (Benhabib 1995, p. 30).

This trend is shared by Carmen Luke, after a period of high hopes for the enrichment of Critical Pedagogy by postmodernist philosophies as an alternative to the phallogentrism of Critical Pedagogy itself. "Feminist pedagogy", she writes in retrospect, "conceptualized as (maternal) nurture and distanced from claims of pedagogical authority and institutional power, leaves itself wide open to the theoretical impossibility of having a 'foundation' from which to arbitrate knowledge, student voices and experiences, and the teacher's own epistemological position. I argue, therefore, that the theoretical turn to and celebration of difference in all feminisms, including feminist pedagogy, raises crucial epistemological and political questions about normativity which, in turn, call into question the theoretical validity and political agenda of feminism's 'truth claims' (Luke 1996, p. 284).

This stand is a starting-point also for criticizing postmodern feminist post-Critical Pedagogy and post-feminist Critical Pedagogy feminisms, which are setting a serious challenge to the various versions of postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy. At the same time, these trends might be included as radical versions of postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy or as their worthy transformation. Cyberfeminism might be a good example of this trend.

According to Plant, "cyberfeminism is an insurrection on the part of the gods and materials of the patriarchal world, a dispersed, distributed emergence composed of links between women, women and computers, computers and communication links, connections and connectionist nets" (Plant 1995, p. 162). Zoe Sofoulis, another

representative of "hard" postmodernism in cyberfeminism, celebrates the post-phallic conjunction of women's art and high-tech (Sofoulis 1994). It is a strong promising illusion: Western culture, which in modern technology reaches the peak of the perverse realization of the Greek concept of *techne* (Heidegger 1996, 307-342), overcomes its immanent instrumentalism and reificationist-orientation in cyberspace. Cyberfeminism, within this concrete utopia, is a prima facie postmodern arena where the essence of femininity and art replaces masculinity and the essence of Western "internal" and "external" colonialism and its commitment to truth-"light"-victory-death. The logic of the Net is conceived as manifesting the truth of femininity: it is symbolized by the clitoris inheriting the Thanatus-oriented masculine drive for truth and victory as symbolized by the phallus. Cyberfeminism, however, includes a rich range of views on these matters.

Representatives of the "soft" postmodern influences on cyberfeminism have explicit feminist emancipatory perspectives and they refuse to see themselves as post-feminists or as post-human. Cyberfeminism is one of many realizations of cyberoptimism (Gur-Ze'ev 1999, p. 439), which contains both "hard" and "soft" postmodern perspectives.

According to the cyberoptimists, cyberspace has no room for traditional Western metaphysical and actual violence. The identification of the immanent colonialist-oriented violence of Western normalizing education and the critique of phallocentrism and patriarchalism meet here in a manner that leaves non-Western and anti-Western educational violences in all their forms, even anti-Western patriarchalism almost unchallenged. The fruits of this attitude will be the sophistication of violent normalizing education and the enrichment of Western electronic normalizing education.

Of vital importance for cyberfeminism is the "overcoming" of "masculine" or

"phallogocentric"-oriented claims for universality, eternity, objectivity, transcendence, and a priori validity judgement claims, which parallels its abandonment of traditional immanent Western commitment to violate the otherness of the Other.

According to Plant, "the phallus and the eye stand in for each other, giving priority to light, sight, and flight from the dark matters of the feminine. The phallic eye has functioned to endow them with the connection to what has variously been defined as God, the good, the one, the ideal form or transcendence" (Plant 1996, p. 172). In contrast to the phallogocentric knowledge and patriarchal-dominated existence, in computer-mediated communication the order is supposed to be feminine and connectionist, associative, and kaleidoscopic and open, not linear, hierarchical, and closed. According to Steffensen, the phallus, linear thinking, hierarchy, transcendence, and domination are replaced by the female clitoris, which is conceived as "a direct line to the matrix" (Steffensen 1998).

Donna Haraway posits a post-feminist "hard" postmodern Messianism, in which "the dichotomies between mind and body, animal and human, organism and machine, public and private, nature and culture, men and women, primitive and civilized are all in question ideologically" (Haraway 1991, 150). This is a new kind of Messianism, which presents itself as dystopia, yet it is a new, postmodern, positive utopia, committed to feminize the world (Plant 1996, p. 1) in a manner that will not make possible transcendence or a quest for redemption, meaning, or Life. "The totally other" will be totally realized in it as a matrix or realm of self-evidence. The subject and her autonomy/oppression becomes radically transformed, and the Enlightenment's ideal of the self-creating dialogical subject is overtaken by the postmodern cyborg (ibid., p. 149).

The implicit philosophy of education in Haraway's texts proceeds from the concepts accepted in postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy to a new horizon. She opens a complete alternative, beyond transcendence and immanence, beyond relativism, temporality, and partiality in a world of total contingency and incommensurability as an improved Garden of Eden. This positive utopia contains a rich educational philosophy even if it refrains from presenting itself as such. It is consistently developed to its logical conclusions within the postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy of Ellsworth and Lather, which perhaps for political reasons pertains to a pedagogical rhetoric which their philosophical pre-assumption and their articulations cannot support, justify, or edify.

This tendency is further developed by "hard" postmodern feminist and post-feminist authors who try to open new educational-philosophical-political-existential horizons. Here the work of Deleuze has a special role, in the sense that while other postmodern thinkers such as Foucault are being consumed, co-opted, or developed by both "soft" and "hard" postmodern feminist educational critiques Deleuze's work best suits the "hard" postmodernists in its essence. As such it can serve best the post-feminists and the post-Critical Pedagogy educational thinkers.

Deleuze's work is relevant to the trends in postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy in the sense that it further develops and justifies the abandonment of the ideal of emancipation, the desertion of responsibility for the otherness of the Other, the centrality of the cultivation and edification of the (potentially) autonomous subject, and the possibility of reflection or ideology-critique which will enable not solely meaning and aim but also resistance and creative bettering of the world.

Deleuze is against philosophy as transcendence. What he defines as radical

empiricism, or transcendental empiricism, is actually an anti-transcendental philosophy in a way that will guarantee the deconstruction of the subject and the doing away with any meaning. Deleuze is committed to philosophy as a project of destroying “generality and particularity, Man and the man, but also Woman and the woman” (Buchanan 2000, 93). To do away with the subject is to do away with any ground or home or thought. This is the essence of “becoming-woman” for Deleuze and Guattari. It is not that the category of woman or the emancipation of woman, or understanding/resisting women’s oppression, is here the telos of the project.

Does postmodern feminist enthusiasm represent a deep understanding of Deleuze? Or is it more of a regrettable misunderstanding of his philosophy, when they celebrate post-Critical Pedagogy imperatives? One such imperative is that offered by Deleuzian Messianism, when he says with Guattari: “If becoming-woman is the first quantum, or molecular segment, with the becoming-animal that link up with it coming next, what are they all rushing towards? Without a doubt, toward a becoming-imperceptible. The imperceptible is the immanent end of becoming, its cosmic formula” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 279). He calls us to overcome, or abandon, dichotomies, criteria, or “conflicts”; they are to be reconstructed, resisted, enhanced or developed into understandings and solutions, since underneath a “conflict” there is never more than “the play of differences” (Deleuze 1994, p. 51).

If cyberfeminism strives to affirm Thanatus by being swallowed by the pleasure machine within which there is room only for the cyborg in the run to meaninglessness and nothingness, for Deleuze the road invites us to struggle or imperceptibility. The Deleuzian telos is that of an all-becoming which is synonyme to a cosmic perception, or

to the total disappearance of the subject (Deleuze 1997, p. 25). Following Mainlaender and the other most radical figures of philosophical pessimism (Gur-Ze'ev 1996), for him this is the ultimate aim of all becoming. Within this framework he articulates the category of “becoming-woman” which has attracted so much enthusiasm in postmodern feminism and among postmodern feminist philosophy of education (Semetsky 2000, Semetsky 2003, Gregoriou 2002). Following Ellsworth and Lather, these trends celebrate a Deleuzian “responsibility for ‘non-mastery’” out of the “ordeal of the undividable” (Lather 1991 in Gregoriou 2002, 235).

The Deleuzian category of “rhizome” is very much at the center of some current postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy projects that I see as post-feminist and post-Critical Pedagogy. Here the “hard” postmodern trends within postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy develop to their logical conclusion. The concepts of nomadism and rhizomatics for Deleuze have much in common with the kind of “connectedness” that Haraway and other cyberoptimists make use of in their postmodern Utopia. “The line-system (or block-system) of becoming is opposed to the point-system of memory. Becoming is the movement by which the line frees itself from the point, and renders points indiscernible: the rhizome, the opposite of arborescence, a break away from arborescence. Becoming is an antimemory” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 294). Rhizomatic existence, however, is far from a vision of a unlimited and unpredicted internal and external creation/becoming. What Deleuze tries to overcome is not solely the Oedipal molar constructs as opposed to the nomadic Body Without Organs. Nomadism here is conceived as part of overcoming subject/object dichotomies, as well as man-woman, or true-false dichotomies. It is not that “or-or” or “either-or” dichotomies are

abandoned, it is that the very “existence” or “meaning” in favor of concept creation where not a self-creative or (potential) dialogic autonomous moral subject is creating, struggling, creating. Ultimately, it is only relations that present themselves as constitutive. In such a world there is room for rhizomatic creation but no room for meaningful suffering, responsibility, hope and hugging, love or resistance to evil, and surely no hope for non-violent transcendence as a moment of “difference” where we respond to the call of “the totally other”. Counter-violence is central to Deleuze, as he envisions a new “war machine” that will challenge the “state apparatuses” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 24). The apparent similarities between the Diasporic philosophy of Adorno and the Deleuzian vision of nomadic life in rhizomatic spaces is exposed as a successful deception realized by no one but the cannibalism of the postmodern pleasure machine (which presents itself as “beyond postmodernism”). Once you overcome the deconstructionist carnivalist suggestion you see that these are opposing utopian projects.

In this sense we should understand that the pleasure machine has the upper hand, when Gregoriou tells us that she finds Deleuze a worthy source for advancing current philosophy of education and pedagogical practices, as an alternative to pedagogy of the postmodern, which “has failed to legitimate itself in the eyes of the students” (Gregoriou 2002, p. 236).

Not only has part of postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy become post-critical. At the present moment of its development it deserts not only Critical Pedagogy but also feminism, and ultimately “soft” “postmodernism” itself. The more it becomes open to “harder” postmodern influences the more it becomes politically neutralized and philosophically pessimistic-oriented. Its importance, nevertheless, is not to be

underestimated.

Post-critical feminist pedagogy is in many respects part of and in others respects an echo of postmodern rhetoric. It is so in two versions that are theoretically incompatible but politically and rhetorically often amalgamated.

Within the first, feminism tries, in vain, to retreat from speculative theory, human solidarity, and transcendence into the safe or concrete “self”. Here the “self” is supposed to be at once the impetus to and an affect of “creativity” and “resistance”. It is at once an omnipotent gaze, or a unique “listening” and a unique “responding”, which ultimately reveals itself as nothing more than a manifestation of meaninglessness: passions and effects of the codes of the discourse, which cannot be transcendent. Almighty immanence is uncompromisingly “flat”. Within this philosophy all de-territorializations, re-positionings, deconstructions and creative effects can manifest nothing but contingent violent discourses, powers, and structures. But we should ask: if the “self” is nothing but their echo how can she genuinely “resist” it? And in what sense is she its victim? And what justifies the acknowledgement of her being an agent or its “echo”? All these questions are to be asked even before we ask: “In what sense is “she” as something and not-someone, actually, different from me who voice her as a victim/agent of the system? Here the abandoning of Critical Pedagogy’s Utopia of dialogue, solidarity, and rational change of reality is negated with no Nietzschean cheerfulness. Decadent sophistication with no promise of Life or even of a tragic end to this part of the human odyssey has lost even the sense of serious nihilism and tragic heroism, which were so dear to Spengler’s rejection of the Enlightenment’s concept of progress at the previous *fin de siècle* (Gur-Ze’ev 1996, pp. 30-31). These thinkers even refrain from rearticulating the essence of the

humanist project, which insists that the human is after all more than, and infinitely different from the power structures that influence her within the framework of normalizing education.

The second version, which negates critical theory and Critical Pedagogy's humanistic universalism, retreats into the realm of self-evidence of the marginalized, the silenced, the oppressed, and the misrepresented. It abandons humanistic universalism and its Utopia, and introduces, instead, an unreflective optimism and functionalist instrumentalism.

Lather presents postmodern feminist pedagogy as an alternative to "philosophies of presence, which assume the historical role of self-conscious human agency and the vanguard role of critical intellectuals" (Lather 1992, p. 131) while reserving a future role for Critical Pedagogy (Lather 1998, p. 497). All this, however, is while going beyond the tradition of critical philosophy itself, not solely beyond Critical Pedagogy: "Perhaps the need to look beyond old critical premises and toward continuing revision might be more palatable if displayed under the sign of (post)critical.... In translating critical theory into pedagogical agenda, (post)critical foregrounds movement beyond the sedimented discursive configurations of essentialized, romanticized subjects with authentic needs and real identities, who require generalized emancipation from generalized social oppression via the mediations of liberatory pedagogues capable of exposing the 'real' to those caught up in the distorting meaning systems of late capitalism" (Lather 1992, p. 131).

According to Weiler, the source of the chief problems of Critical Pedagogy is the modernistic conceptualizations of the Critical Pedagogy thinkers, who use concepts such as "class", while the context of many of them, as in the case of Freire, contradicts the

background and the possibilities of critical theory and Critical Pedagogy, as the ones possible in technologically advanced countries. Weiler rightly claims that even the dichotomy between oppressors and oppressed is too brutal and should be problematized in Critical Pedagogy (Weiler 1991, 452). Another important element in this critique challenges the sexist attitude of Critical Pedagogy. Even if one can find some traces of it in Freire's work, it is wrong to blame Shor, McLaren, and Giroux for it. This is politically oriented rhetoric founded on a common philosophical ground, such as that concerned with the concept of human beings held by Carmen Luke, Jennifer Gore, Kathleen Weiler, and Henry Giroux.

Weiler, in opposition to Lather and Ellsworth, aims at saving Critical Pedagogy's emancipatory project via feminist pedagogy (*ibid.*, 455). She combines sensitivity to differences and personal experience as a founding element of knowledge (*ibid.*, 463, 466) with the commitment to universal emancipation. However, in keeping with the fashionable rhetoric in postmodern and radical feminism, she negates "essentialism" and a comprehensive critical theory, so the concept of a certain "identity" that has to be emancipated becomes abstract. She is on the verge of an antithesis to the emancipatory project, insofar as this stand is philosophically grounded.

Luke properly seeks the source of Critical Pedagogy's problematic in its relations to critical theory. In our technological, social, and cultural context, asks Luke, what value can the critical theory of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse have? (Luke 1992, 45). She shares post-critical feminist pedagogy's critique of the pedagogical actualization of critical theory as leading to or based on androgynous essentialism and naive realism. Such an education leads to the quest to control the masses and to activate them in a

unified collective manner that will make “liberation” possible. She criticizes this stand as detached from real history and from the acknowledgment of real power relations and actual discourse (ibid.). However, at the same time she tries to avoid the kind of relativism into which Ellsworth and Lather are drawn. She does not totally abandon her modernist theoretical commitment to the power of grand narratives for reconstruction and creation. But in what sense do these two versions of postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy really challenge the Frankfurt School critical theory?

The concept of reason of critical theory is very different from the one challenged by postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy thinkers. Actually, they attack a straw man, and unfortunately they are too far from challenging the genuine problematic of the Frankfurt School concept of reason. In some respects critical theory as an implicit Diasporic philosophy is much closer to the concepts of reason held by Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Jean Lyotard than to the ones held by Juergen Habermas, Jenifer Gore, Kathleen Weiler, and Carmen Luke. This problematic is manifested brilliantly in the mature parts of the Frankfurt School critical theory, which beginning with *The Dialectics of Enlightenment* was overlooked or forgotten by Critical Pedagogy’s friends and foes alike.

Late Adorno and Horkheimer occupied themselves in reconstructing the historical development and the concrete social and cultural circumstances of the instrumentalization of reason as a non-reversible development in the present historical moment (Horkheimer 1985, XIV, 141). Within the Western historical framework of critical theory, they conclude that unless an unpredictable interference occurs, no good intentions and progressive talent of educators devoted to counter-education will be of much help in

countering these developments. On the historical level, the instrumentalization of rationality is reconstructed as representing and serving the imperatives of technological progress and economic development, which have become the dominant cultural ruling logic. Instrumental rationality becomes “a magic essence”, and it is right to describe it as the triumphant return home of mythos (Horkheimer 1974, p. 96), which leaves no room for the kind of critical human subject that the Enlightenment was committed to edify (Horkheimer 1985 VII, p. 26). In such a reality, there is no place for an alternative positive utopianism or for a positive Critical Pedagogy, which will challenge the present order, its apparatuses, and powers (Horkheimer 1974, p. 26). There is actually a predestined harmony between “the system” and “the victim”. The human subject has become today what fascism strove to reduce her to, which is a natural human existence (Horkheimer, Horkheimerarchiv VI. 1a, pp. 26-27). The constitution of an order that represents extreme and unchallenged rationality in such a context is irrational from traditional objective reason’s point of view (Horkheimer 1985, p. 159). This rationality is realized by almost complete control of the psychic structure and the conscious of individuals and collectives. However, this does not mean that under such conditions there is no room for “pluralism”, for false forming of the various modes of false critical conscious. Such a false critical conscious can be manifested in the naive emancipatory project of “paternalist” Critical Pedagogy and its postmodern alternatives, which are committed to positive utopianism. The historical reconstruction of instrumental rationality’s victory, however, is complemented by an ontological dimension which is of vital importance for the possibilities of grounding the hermeneutics of the self and the possibilities of a new educational dialogue grounded in the sensitivity and understanding

of “difference”.

Right from its first stage, the ontological dimension was central to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School thinkers in terms of the possibilities of emancipation and the success of counter-education in a reality where instrumental rationality celebrates its victory over the tradition of objective reason. It is manifested, for example, in Walter Benjamin’s *To the Critique of Violence* (Benjamin, 1974), in which political violence is elaborated in the historical context where there is no room for redemption but where, at the same time, the facts of actuality do not have the last word. The real is conceived within a framework in which history is just one of its moments. The Diasporic gaze overcomes the dichotomy between transcendence and immanence and it manifest the otherness as a unique kind of listening, which is both a-historical and historical, individual and universal, relates to the power games, yet it is never to be reduced to the productivity of the governing manipulations. It is never a true citizen in the Augustinian "earthly city", yet it rejects any kind of "heavenly city", church, or dogma to dwell in. It avoids all utopian kinds of "returning home" (Gur-Ze'ev, forthcoming). In this respect, metaphorically, it is "Jewish". As such its very Diasporic existence is threatened from "within" – to become "Zionized" – and from everything "outside" – to be extinguished, or morally executed, as the victim who became the arch victimizer, the Nazi of the present day (Almatukal 1989, 63.). To the fully developed critical theory, the triumphant return of the myth within the framework of instrumental rationality is even worse today than its ancient version. This is because of its more efficient penetrating possibilities (Adorno and Horkheimer 1988, 9). In this context, the erosion of the possibilities for the very existence of an autonomous subject is totally neglected by critical thinkers. This does not

mean that Benjamin, Adorno, and Horkheimer abandoned Utopia, or that from here one should ignore the educational meanings, some of which are quite close to some central conceptions and sensitivities of current postmodernism. However, one should not ignore the fact that such a critical theory repudiates the optimistic pre-assumptions and the positive Utopia of the dominant versions of Critical Pedagogy and their various alternatives.

In postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy the claim for liberation is grounded in a dialectical acceptance of the equality of different discourses, strives, pains, interests, identities and cultures, and the very possibility of defending and developing the category of “feminism” or “woman” becomes an impossibility. As a result, the commitment to solidarity, as the possibility of developing and defending feminine identity and knowledge, is to be decided by the violence of symbolic dynamism and power games which rule the social space. This version of Critical Pedagogy, like other major trends in current Critical Pedagogy, has not succeeded in synthesizing the problematic of essentialism, foundationalism, and transcendence, or the recognition of the Other’s suffering, rights, and potentialities with the preconditions and claims of a philosophy that insists on human reflection, transcendence and love from the framework of philosophical pessimism.

Fully developed critical theory understood the realization of Enlightenment in our era as a mass deception within the framework of the culture industry, in which the subject too is transformed into a commodity, including Critical Pedagogy’s educational knowledge. The rationalization of all levels and dimensions of life and the progress of instruments and possibilities of controlling the subjects by the system (Poster 1989, 67) brought to its

peak the use of the subject as a totally committed agent of reproduction of the realm of self-evidence. Under such conditions it is impossible to escape the omnipotence of the system (Horkheimer 1974, 95-96). The historical reconstruction of dynamics suitable for the demolition of the ideal of the rational subject and its concrete possibilities is realized here on one level. On the other, theoretical, level, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, from the very beginning “the individual” is nothing but an illusion that normally serves the strengthening of the control over people’s consciousness and the construction of life possibilities that will enable the maximization of their productivity in the service of the system in which they are activated (ibid. 141). This productivity is conditioned by the degree of their normalization, and that is the real aim of education. This subject-reason two-level concept of Adorno and Horkheimer follows Benjamin’s two-level concept of time, revolution, and redemption, which they forcefully rejected in the first stage of the development of their thought in light of their Marxist positivism; but later they were so happy to abandon it only in order to embrace – and develop – Benjamin's negative utopia. This abandonment is not only a loss. It is also to be considered as a sign of the transformation of critical theory into an explicit Diasporic philosophy which opens an alternative door to the presence of loss, worthy suffering, human edification and creativity. Of vital importance here is the Jewish concept of hope, which refuses a positive concept of redemption.

Hope which emanates from theology is a central element in this concept of critical knowledge: "Theology is - and I consciously phrase it carefully - the hope that injustice, which is typical of the world, will not have the last say... a yearning that in the end the hand of the killer will not remain on top of the innocent victim" (Horkheimer, 1985, VII.,

p. 389). In this sense Horkheimer's concept of hope is close to Multmann's, i.e., *spero, ut intelligam*: I hope therefore I understand (Zahnt, 1966, p. 254). This is the touchstone for Benjamin's and Horkheimer's negative utopianism, which is so important for the possibility of current counter-education: the possibility of saving the purpose of the struggle for the self-constitution of a free, solidaristic, Diasporic, individual; a struggle for the clarification of moral causes via social involvement, via political praxis. According to Horkheimer, "the good" may shine in spite of everything, not within a positive utopia, but in a stubborn struggle "against the ruling power" (Adorno and Horkheimer 1988, p. 230), a struggle with no arrogance, and lacking optimism. And this is his route for clarifying the "truth" as "the thought that rejects injustice" (ibid.). For Horkheimer, as earlier for Benjamin, "the path is the truth" (Horkheimer, 1978, p. 212). This is an endless, path, whose homelessness is Diaspora.

In opposition to the Enlightenment's vision of the common good, truth, beauty, or universal human rights, desires, and potentialities as a utopia that should be struggled for and should empower the critique of its actual negation, post-critical feminist pedagogy represents the self-evidence, the false-conciseness, and the impotence of the marginalized as foundations or "truth" to be empowered and directed against the self-evidence of the hegemonic ideology.

From this perspective, the consensus reached by the reflective subject taking part in the dialogue offered by postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy represents a misleading positive Utopia. This is so especially in light of its declared anti-intellectualism on the one hand, and its pronounced glorification of "feelings", "experience", and self-evident knowledge of the marginalized collective, on the other.

Postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy, in its different versions, claims to overcome the foundationalism and transcendentalism of Enlightenment's emancipatory and ethnocentric arrogance, as exemplified by ideology critique, psychoanalysis, or traditional metaphysics. Marginalized feminist knowledge, like the marginalized, neglected, and ridiculed knowledge of the Brazilian farmers, as presented by Freire, becomes a model for the legitimate and relevant knowledge. This knowledge is represented as the foundation for an alternative to hegemonic education, and as an alternative to the knowledge it represents as relevant, legitimate, and superior. However, neither the truth value of the marginalized collective memory nor knowledge is cardinal here. "Truth" as resistance to injustice is replaced here by knowledge, whose supreme criterion is the power of self-evidence. In other words, the potential productivity of the creative violent apparatuses which put it into operation and into "being". These are the apparatuses that represent and serve the same order of things which fabricates the human subject and her evaluation and judgment possibilities, which all function under the command of the return of the myth as an omnipotent postmodern pleasure machine. The dialogue in which adorers of "difference" take part is actually a desired production of this same pleasure machine. From a critical point of view which is true to itself, marginalized and oppressed self-evident knowledge has no advantage over the self-evident knowledge of the oppressors (Gur-Ze'ev, 1998, p. 480). Reliance on the knowledge of the controlled and marginalized collectives, on their memory and their conscious interests, is wrong and dangerous no less than reliance on hegemonic knowledge.

Postmodern feminist pedagogies are far from being courageous enough to face the promise of worthy suffering and to address meaninglessness as an ontological

transcending sign of exiled meaning. For all the importance of the postmodern feminist educational critiques, and especially in light of their critique on the critical tradition, they have failed to approach the essence of the truth of educational violence. One of the main reasons for the failure of this project is its insistence on a positive utopia, on the one hand, and its rejection of a Diasporic existence on the other. It insists on conquering the arena and making it a safe, familiar, earthly Garden of Eden. "The fall", it insists, must be overcome or at least corrected.

In all its versions, postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy does not try to go beyond the transcendent-immanent dichotomies and "solutions". It is so close to doing so, yet it never makes the "tiger's leap", the concluding move, into an attempt to articulate a Diasporic philosophy of counter-education. The mature work of Adorno and Horkheimer, which Horkheimer represented as a development of Jewish negative theology (Horkheimer 1985 VIII., p. 183, Horkheimer 1985, VII, pp. 386-390), might offer us a worthy guide to such a Diasporic philosophy, which some feminist philosophers of education have sought, in the work of Deleuze and in the promise of cyberfeminism. Here, on the edge of the creativity of Eros and Thanatos, in face of the fabrication/deconstruction of immanence and transcendence, postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy fulfills and consumes itself at its best. It is where it is so close to disconcealing the absence of true Diasporic philosophy in the critical and feminist critical feminisms.

A Diasporic philosophy, which is true to itself, cannot become relevant to counter-education by a mere intellectual act or as an act of pure will to power. The becoming, or the becoming-emancipated in face of the utopian "not-yet" and the nearness to the truth

of Being meet in the Diasporic philosophy. It is not created or revealed, it is not solely immanent, and it is not merely a transcendent element. It is philo-sophia as a mode of ecstatic existence in the nearness of Being. As a religious becoming, it is a concrete utopia, which is present in this world, in reality, within material conditions at a specific historical moment. It becomes present as that which is referred to by drives, shortage, suffering, and absence – but also by non-mechanistic creation, happiness, and love that knows how to give birth.

As Horkheimer conceived Judaism, a Diasporic philosophy is a religious commitment to negativism. “Judaism”, according to Horkheimer, is unique in its rejection of a conception of God as a positive absolute. This is the reason for its concentration on the human and not in the essence of God. Its Utopia is negative. Judaism was never a strong state – it was hope for justice (Horkheimer 1978, p. 206). It is “a non-positivistic religion” (Horkheimer 1988, pp. 331-332).

If a Diasporic philosophy is to be articulated today its “Jewish” heritage should transcend ethnocentrism and become universalist. Its universalism must be manifested in its existential, aesthetic, moral, and intellectual dimensions. And its contexts should be historic, cultural, social, and political realities. As a way-of-homeless-life, Diasporic philosophy represents creativity of a unique kind in the capitalist hegemonic realm of self-evidence: it is “feminine” and “Jewish”.

As “feminine” it gives life. It gives birth to life. It gives birth to life as responsibility for Life as more than mere life; without surrendering instrumental-oriented “masculinity” to “patriarchalism” and to all the other manifestations of violence. It realizes the essence of feminism as self-creation in which the self transcends selfhood by responding to “the

totally Other”. It is a response which is also an impetus. An impetus which gives birth to the Other as the most intimate fellow-human and to the worthiest togetherness. It is affluent and as such it is not impotent, yet it commits itself to love of Life. While it cannot be content with itself it is closer to its mission when its affluence gives birth to hope. It offers love. It offers human new beginnings, as the most serious improvisation with the given “facts” into a never one-dimensional Life, where the Other in his otherness is indispensable. It is the diametrical opposite of patriarchalism exactly when it complements true masculinity. It meets the essence of Judaism when it relates much more to the all-presence yet non-linearity and non-hierarchical presence of SHECHINA (providence) as a dialectical opposition to ELOHIM (God) (Idel XXXX) As such it offers the negation to normalizing education and to the omnipotence of the “facts”, existing “power-relations”, “codes” of “our” discourse, and to the imperatives of the “historical moment”. As a religious impetus it actualizes what postmodern feminist critical education strives for in vain: it realizes counter-education without being swallowed into counter-violence.

What we are faced with here is a moment of ontological Diaspora. Diaspora, here, is much more than an edge whither an uprooted collective is being exiled, or lives in, while in quest of “returning home”. Ontological Diaspora is made possible only by the Diasporic stance of Being itself, namely as the exile of nothingness. We do not have to go into theological articulations as to the stance of God the creator as exiled and into God’s evil, suffering, and impotence (Feuerbach 1975, p. 13) to be able to see creation itself, Life itself, as a Diasporic ontological dimension. And, accordingly, as in Judaism, human Diasporic existence is an ecstatic Messianic existence, which has no “transcendent” or

“immanent” truth, interest, or “home”. It is the way of life of an eternal loving stranger.

Counter-education is determined by such homelessness. Like the Jews (before Zionism damaged so severely the essence of Judaism) it represents a negative utopia as a concrete utopia to live by, not to live at. The gap between the two is enabled by the same “material” which enables the abyss between the (pre-rational) “ethical I” and the (rational, politically contextualized) “moral I”. The meeting of the essence of “Judaism” and the essence of “feminism” enables a struggle over the possibility of counter-education, which is *prima facie* a Utopia, never a reality. It is a negative Utopia, which is not to be disconnected from the tradition of negative theology. As such it calls for humans to be prepared to be addressed in an un-instrumental burst-in of the unexpected, of the newly-born, of Genesis. Here humans are called to be challenged in a way which will awake/create the “ethical I”. It is a possible awakening, never a guaranteed one. And as such it is actualized morally and pragmatically in history, in and against a concrete discourse, collective, country or “home”. Here human’s genuine home is every moment anew thrown beyond the existing horizons of the world of power-games and successful violence. It is represented by hope. Hope is here actualized by the absence of the Messiah, by a constant responsibility for Diasporic awakening. This awakening is not abstract; it is tested by doing, by doing the good, by doing the good which enables truth as resistance to injustice, and by giving birth in the reality as the realization of the uniqueness of Genesis every moment anew.

As such, counter-education rejects all versions of collectivism and claims for the truth, the good, or the beautiful as a realization of the “we”, “ours” or any dogma. It insists on “universalism” in the sense that is determined by suffering and promised by hope for

happiness. As a “feminine” - “Judaist” rejection of violence it insists on Life. Here “the good” is not “good” because it has the upper hand, but because it continues to give birth to resisting the victory of violence (Horkheimer 1978, p. 207). Like the Jews, women along the history of culture faced discrimination, and the refusal to be acknowledged or respected in their otherness. And yet, like the Jews throughout history, in face of infinite evil (Horkheimer 1978, p. 206) counter-education should insist today on its Diasporic, non-violent, responsibility for that which is beyond mere life as the purpose of life. And even this commitment within the framework of a Diasporic philosophy is accepted in a non-dogmatic manner: Diasporic philosophy tells counter-education clearly that the demand for justice might be realized only at the cost of its transformation into its negative. It cannot become triumphant unless it becomes another manifestation of normalizing education.

This is what postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy refuses to acknowledge even when it defends the better parts of the dominant Critical Pedagogy. Here, on the other hand, the essence of postmodern feminist Critical Pedagogy contradicts its adorers’ ideology and meets its destiny: it becomes a genuine counter-education. As such it is never at home, never genuinely true to itself, always in the state of “becoming-a-woman”.

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