| Authors: | Cristi K Lindblom
Robert G Ruland |
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| Volume: | 16 | ||||
| Issue: | 5 | ||||
| Start Page: | 573 | ||||
| ISSN: | 01674544 | ||||
| Subject Terms: | CPAs
Business ethics Codes Professional standards Studies CPAs Business ethics Codes Professional standards Studies Business ethics Codes CPAs |
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| Classification Codes: | 9190: US
4110: Accountants 8305: Professional services 2410: Social responsibility 9130: Experimental/theoretical treatment |
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| Geographic Names: | US
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| ABSTRACT. The sociological models of functionalism and conflict are introduced and utilized to analyze professionalism in the accounting profession as it is manifest in the American Institute of Certified Public Accountant's Code of Conduct. Rule 203 of the Code and provisions of the Code related to the public interest are examined using semiotic analysis to determine if they are most consistent with the functionalist or conflict models. While the analysis does not address intent of the Code, it is determined that the Code contains semantic defects which result in different interpretations of the Code to different readers. The defects found are most consistent with the conflict model of professionalism. This has implications for the public and for individuals within the profession, making the Code less useful to both groups. The defects are seen as a potential battleground for the self-interest vs the public interest orientation of the accounting profession. |
Professionalism in the context of accounting is dissimilar to that in the legal or medical setting because of the disparate nature of the professional obligation.1 While there is a professional/client relationship in accounting, because an inherent aspect of the practice of accounting involves disclosure to the public, the public assumes a role which is distinct from that of the client and which may be incompatible with that of the client. Professionalism in accounting, then, should be viewed in the context of a triad consisting of the professional, the client, and the public. The professional may be in the position where loyal and faithful service to the client may result in less than perfectly trustworthy information being reported to the public, while full disclosure to the public may be perceived as a disservice to the client. The potential dilemma which results from the auditor's responsibility to the client and responsibility to the public is a significant issue at both the individual and institutional levels. Individual professionals confront this dilemma in the routine practice of accounting and the profession (as an institution) should give guidance to the individual professional regarding ethical resolution of the dilemma. The profession's response to this dilemma is the topic of analysis for this paper.
One response a profession may utilize to assist an individual professional in the resolution of a professional dilemma is to develop and disseminate a code of ethics in which the dilemma is addressed. This paper will analyze the use of codes of ethics by professions and specifically examine aspects of the Code of Conduct of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) which are relevant to the dilemma inherent in the accounting professional being responsible to both the client and the public.
Sociological models
Analysis of a code of ethics must be placed within the broader context of professions and professionalism because the very reason for the existence of such codes is subject to debate. While there is a continuum of points of view possible, two competing sociological models will be utilized in this analysis. They are the functionalist model and the conflict model.
The functionalist view of the profession is so named because it originates from the functionalist school of socio-anthropology, specifically the work of Talcott Parsons (1954). Functionalists see the professions "as a positive force in social development, standing against the excesses of both laissez-faire individualism and state collectivism" (Johnson: p. 12). Those who advocate the functionalist model assume the professions come into existence to meet a genuine human need. Professionals are granted a special position in society because they are able to address a human need utilizing knowledge which has been acquired through specialized training, training which is open to all who have the appropriate levels of ability and dedication. The superior quality of the professional's work results in the high social, economic, and legal position which is enjoyed by professionals. Professionals are also assumed to have a service orientation which will result in service to anyone in need (Kultgen 1988, p. 76).
Utilization of the conflict model results in a very different view of professionalism. Conflict theorists see the professions as "harmful monopolistic oligarchies whose rational control of technology would lead to some form of meritocracy" (Johnson, 1972, p. 12). Professions would be assumed to "fulfill no special function in society, beyond whatever social territory its members have managed, historically, to control." (Newton, 1982, p. 34) The high social, economic, and legal position enjoyed by professionals would be seen to result from their monopolistic position which professional groups maintain by controlling entry to the profession through arbitrary educational requirements as well as other barriers.
Professional codes
One of the frequently cited characteristics of a profession is the existence of professional codes, often in the form of codes of ethics. An adherent to the functionalist model would assume that codes of ethics are formulated by professional groups because the code is "the institutional manifestation of the `service ideal"'. (Kemper, 1976) An institutional manifestation of the ideal is important to functionalists because, as Parsons points out, altruism on the part of professionals is not likely. Instead, the institutional framework in which a profession operates creates expectations for professionals which may include a service ideal. Professional codes can be assumed necessary to establish expectations for professional behavior in the public interest. It is conceivable that a professional could act out of self-interest for his or her entire career and still fulfill a service ideal because of expectations embodied in a code. Codes are also necessary for the self-policing which is expected of professionals. (Newton, 1982, p. 34) In sum, within the functionalist model, professional codes are simply a feature or characteristic of professionalism.
An adherent to the conflict model would assume that codes of ethics are designed to legitimize self-serving arrangements in the name of professionalism and to serve as public relations devices intended to dupe the public, legislators and other officials into believing certain occupational groups are worthy of the autonomy and other benefits which are granted to professions. This position is summarized by Daniels (1973) as, "[Codes] are part of the ideology, designed for public relations and justification for the status and prestige which professions assume vis-a-vis more lowly occupations." (p. 49) Under this model, codes are an artifice of occupational groups attempting to gain the benefits society grants to perceived professional groups.
Thus, depending upon the model one accepts, professional codes are "instruments for persuasion both of members of the profession and the public" which either "codify actual practices or those that leaders actually want to foster" or consist of "false descriptions and pretended norms" (Kultgen, 1988, p. 212). Codes may be expected to evolve simply as a feature of professionalism or to be developed as a stratagem to obtain the benefits of professionalism. Kultgen delineates two contributions a code may make. First, since it is commonly accepted that every genuine profession has an ethic, "[a]n occupation's code conveys the impression that this is true for it and hence that it is a profession". (p. 212) Second, the code communicates to the public and is intended to instill trust in the practices of the occupation. It is the accuracy of the impression and the sincerity of the communication that determines which sociological model best fits as a description of a particular profession.
From the above discussion, four general purposes for professional codes may be delineated.
The purposes, which are described further below, are to:
(1) Provide a moral foundation for the profession.
(2) Serve as a basis for self-policing of the profession.
(3) Promote the self-interest of the profession.
(4) Serve as public relations tools.
The first two purposes are most consistent with the functionalist model while the remaining two are most consistent with the conflict model.
Under the perception that codes provide a moral foundation for the profession, the assumed purpose the code is to communicate the ethical behaviors expected in professional practice to members of the profession and to the public. The codes thus serve to define the moral principles and priorities of the profession. Commonality of the moral foundation becomes a source of pride to the community of professionals and fosters a sense of belonging and cohesion to the profession and to fellow professionals.
A common moral foundation also provides standard for professional; behavior and thus serves the second purpose of professional codes, establishing a basis and process for the self-policing mechanism of the profession. Policing of some sort is assumed to be necessary under the functionalist model because, as Parsons (1954) points out, the model does not preclude self-interested behavior on the part of professionals. Thus, some professionals may be tempted to behave in a manner which is inconsistent with the expectations of the profession. A policing mechanism should both serve to discourage deviant behavior and to remove violators from the profession.
Self-policing, as opposed to policing by parties external to the profession, is a traditional characteristic of professions. It is assumed necessary because the high level of training and skill inherent in professional practice leaves only members of the profession qualified to evaluate the performance of other members.
The interpretation of codes as a means to promote the self-interest of professions could explain elements of some professional codes such as bans on advertising and limitations on pricing and competition (some of these restrictions have been addressed by the courts as limiting competition, ie., violations of fair trade). As stated by Hauptman and Hill (1991, p. 38), ". . . professionals can be uncaring, socially irresponsible, untrustworthy, self-promoting, greedy, and dishonest and then defend themselves by working the unacceptable or unethical behavior patterns into their professional codes as ostensibly positive necessities."
Finally, according to the interpretation that professional codes are public relations tools, codes are intended to foster a positive image of the profession among the public. This serves to increase the benefits, such as higher social status and compensation levels, that the public is willing to extend to the profession. The profession is thus perceived as using the code of ethics to associate itself with characteristics and behaviors the public desires, even though the perceptions may differ from the actual practices of the profession.
AICPA Code of Conduct
Depending upon the sociological model to which one adheres, it might be assumed that the Code of Professional Conduct of the AICPA is intended to establish a "moral" base of the profession for members of the profession and society or, alternatively, that the Code is public relations document designed to facilitate the self-interest of the profession. The objectives of the AICPA's Code of Conduct, as stated in the Preamble, are to express the profession's recognition of its responsibilities to the public, to clients, and to colleagues, to guide members in the performance of their professional responsibilities, and to express the basic tenets of ethical and professional conduct. The objectives position the members apart as a "profession" with responsibilities to the public as well as clients and each other. The objectives include guidance for the performance of members, implying that the Code is a document to which the professional is able to turn for resolution of issues in practice. In sum, the objectives hold the Code out as a statement of the moral foundation of the profession and thus a basis for self-policing activity.
The objectives of the Code are consistent with expectations regardless of whether one supports the functionalist model or conflict model. According to the functionalist model, the objectives truly provide a moral foundation for the profession and a basis for self-policing in accordance with a public service ideal. In contrast, from perspective of the conflict model the objectives are merely necessary pretensions for the profession to advance the self-interest of its members.
The AICPA adopted a revised "Code of Conduct" in 1988. The stated purpose of the revisions was to respond to the "expectations gap". The expectations gap is the difference between the public perception of the profession's responsibilities and the perception of those responsibilities the profession holds for itself. There are three ways in which the Code could serve to prevent or, in the case of revisions, reduce the expectation gap and, thus, increase the legitimacy of the profession. First, the Code could be used to ensure that the responsibilities of professionals are consistent with public perceptions of what is appropriate. This would close the expectations gap by changing professional behavior where necessary to align professional behavior with public expectations. Second, the profession could use the Code to educate the public as to the appropriateness of existing professional responsibilities. This would close the gap changing public perceptions where necessary to align public expectations with professional behavior. According to the functionalist model, one would expect the Code to conform to one of these two patterns. The establishment of Codes consistent with these patterns would result in the public being better inform about professional responsibilities.
A third way of having the Code prevent or reduce the gap would be to give the appearance of consistency with the position of the public without actually doing anything to reconcile the differing expectations for professional responsibility. This would be most consistent with the conflict model with the Code being used as an artifice to advance self-interest of members of the profession. Code revisions consistent with this manner of closing the gap would attempt to change public perceptions without actually better informing the public of the responsibilities being accepted by the profession or changing the responsibilities themselves.
Sections of the 1988 Code concerning public interest and professional judgment are particularly relevant to the expectations gap and the the issue of which sociological model best describes the Code:
Public interest in the Code
One of the differences between the current Code and its predecessor is the inclusion in the Principles section of the Code a statement of the public interest orientation of the profession. The Principle section states:
A distinguishing mark of a profession is acceptance of its responsibilities to the public.... The public interest is defined as the collective well-being of the community of people and institutions the profession serves.
In discharging their professional responsibilities, members may encounter conflicting pressures from among each of those groups. In resolving those conflicts, members should act with integrity, guided by the precept that when members fulfill their responsibility to the public, clients' and employers' interests are best served. (Code 1988, ET Section 53, Article II)
Professional judgment in the Code
A characteristic of the both the current Code and its predecessor is the inclusion of language in Rule 203 which establishes when departures from GAAP are allowable. The language in the 1988 version of the Code is as follows: If, however, the statements or data contain such a departure and the member can demonstrate that due to unusual circumstances the financial statements or data would otherwise have been misleading, the member can comply with the rule by describing the departure, its approximate effects, if practicable, and the reasons why compliance with the principle would result in a misleading statement. (Code 1988, ET Section 203.01)
This imparts the appearance of granting the professional a way in certain situations of encouraging disclosure that is different from GAAP without causing the professional to be in conflict with another of the professional obligations, confidentially. Indeed, the confidentiality rule, Rule 301, while stating that "A member in public practice shall not disclose any confidential information without the specific consent of the client" (Code 1988, ET Section 301.01), states that this is not to be construed so as to relieve a member of obligations under Rule 203.
A lay person would likely interpret the above sections of the AICPA Code as indicating the accounting professionals consider service to the public as the dominant force guiding performance of professional duties. Furthermore, a lay person would expect the financial statements presented to be in conformity with GAAP unless the statements prepared in conformance with GAAP were misleading. If GAAP resulted in financial statements which were misleading a lay person would likely expect the exercise of professional judgement to present financial statements which, while not in compliance with GAAP, were not misleading. The public view of the professional/client/public triad is one of professional obligation to present information in which the public can place its trust.
While the above described lay person's interpretation are reasonable based upon what is in the Code of Conduct, accountants will not necessarily interpret these portions of the Code in the same way. To the extent that the provisions of the Public Interest principle and/or Rule 203 were intended to close or prevent the expectations gap, they can be evaluated in terms of what they communicate to the public and to the professional. Thus the provisions can be evaluated both in terms of the degree of direction provided to the individual professional and by the nature of communication to the public.
Analysis of the AICPA's Code of Conduct
The objective of this analysis is to evaluate the AICPA's Code of Conduct in terms of the two sociological models. The analysis is based on Kultgen's (1988) "semiotic virtues" which affect the meaning of codes for various audiences. The existence of "Semantic defects allow different audiences to read different meanings into a text or prevent them from finding any definite meaning in it at all." (Kultgen, 1988, p. 219) The semantic defects are deficiencies of logical structure, presuppositions of a code, and clarity, precision, and univocity of words and phrases. Deficiencies of logical structure. The AICPA's Code of Conduct consists of Principles and Rules. According to the Code, the Principles "provide a framework for the rules". The Principles are intended to "guide members in the performance of their professional responsibilities" while the Rules, "govern the performance of professional services by members". The Rules are enforceable while the Principles are not.
By placing the public interest guidelines in the Principles section, the profession communicates differently to lay persons and professionals. It would be in keeping with conventional language usage to expect principles to supersede rules. However, in the AICPA Code, because only the rules are enforceable, the professional's attention is more likely to be focused on rules than on principles. This is not only because of enforceability in a strict sense but also because enforceability will be seen by the individual professional as a statement of priority by the profession. It seems reasonable from the perspective of the professional to assume that if certain things are not enforceable and other things are, that the profession has thus established the priorities to be observed in practice. Therefore, the Principle/ Rule structure of the Code communicates differently to the public and to the professional.
The extent of the semantic defect might be minimized if it were not for on other structural issue. The Rules have not been logically derived from the Principles. This constitutes a deficiency of logical structural which is a semantic defect, resulting in lack of common understanding of the resulting Code. The lack of common understanding may not only be between the public and the professionals but also has the potential to communicate differently to individual professionals.
This defect in the Code has been discussed by Ruland and Lindblom (1992) in terms of professional duties. They conclude that the Principles constitute implicit duties and the Rules constitute explicit duties and that the two may be in conflict in this area of the public interest versus the client's interest and that there are circumstances the implicit duties should dominate. The analysis of Ruland and Lindblom was intended to illustrate that conflicts of duties do exist and that the Code as currently written does not necessarily support ethical behavior on the part of accountants.
Additionally, the Code is structured with not only rules, but interpretations of the rules. While Rule 203 includes the possibility of taking exception to GAAP, interpretations 1 and 2 (ET Section 203.02 and 0.03) severely restrict the circumstances under which exceptions may be made. Interpretation 1 includes examples of events which may justify a departure from an accounting principle, including new legislation or the evolution of a new form of business transaction. These two circumstances hardly seem to require professional judgement as to whether or not an exception should be taken. On the other hand, the interpretation says that an unusual degree of materiality or the existence of conflicting industry practice are examples of situations which would not ordinarily be regarded as appropriate for a Rule 203 exception. It can be argued that these are precisely the situations which call for professional judgement. Therefore, the professional, reading the Rule and the interpretation, would most likely conclude that the profession has done little in the Code to support exceptions to GAAP-based financial statements.
Presuppositions of a Code. There is a lack of common understanding about what auditors do and what an audit opinion represents. The view of the auditor is that the audit is a limited process and an unqualified opinion provides only limited assurances. The Code and professional standards it legitimizes define the limits and thus, auditors perceive, provide protection for the auditor. The public, on the other hand, attributes more to the audit process and views an unqualified opinion as "a clean bill of health".3 These differing presuppositions may lead to lack of common understanding of trustworthiness and that in turn may cause different readings of that which appears in the code.
Another presupposition which may interfere with a common understanding of the message in the Code rests in the assumption of the nature of professional service. Larson (1977) draws on economic determinism to explain the differences in the way in which professions develop. Her comparison of the medical and engineering professions is relevant to this discussion because there are characteristics of the auditing profession which parallel those of the engineering profession. The public may have as its model of professional service the medical profession where the physician enters the profession and continues as a physician for the entire span of the professional life. Newton (1982) summarizes Larson's description of the contrasting situation for engineers as follows:
"Engineers work in large firms on salaries. As a result, the condition of an engineer's professional practice is dependency, not so much on his employer's pleasure as on the business cycle. The economics of profit and cost are at the very heart of his assignment. . . . [The] career aspirations of engineers have management of those firms as their natural terminus[.] (p. 36)
The parallel between the auditor and the engineer is obvious. Most auditors also work for large firms and the auditor's professional practice is dependent upon the business cycle with the economics of profit and cost at the heart of the auditor's professional assignments as well. Likewise, for many auditors the natural terminus of their career is management of the firms. Auditors who stay in professional practice will have their job evolve from performing audit services to selling both audit and non-audit services. In the case of most auditors the situation may be even more severe because the majority of the persons entering the profession will rise to management, not of the auditing firm, but rather of a service or manufacturing firm - often one with which their first contact was in the auditor/client context. Different presuppositions as to the nature of the career pattern of auditors could lead to a dissimilar reading of the content of the Code.
Clarity, precision, and univocity of words and phrases. Both aspects of the Code addressing the public interest and professional judgment lend themselves to analysis in terms of clarity, precision, and univocity of the words and phrases. The Public Interest Principle states:
The accounting profession's public consists of clients, credit grantors, governments, employers, investors, the business and financial community, and others who rely on the objectivity and integrity of certified public accountants to maintain the orderly functioning of commerce.
The public as it is defined in this Principle includes as the first category, clients. To the extent a dilemma exists between the auditor's responsibilities to a client and to the public as more commonly defined, this phrasing may add ambiguity.
Recall that the section also says that in resolving conflicts "members should act with integrity, guided by the precept that when members fulfill their responsibility to the public, clients' and employers' interests are best served". This is an extraordinarily vague statement. Not only is the vagueness compounded by the definition of the public, "act with integrity" may be interpreted as calling for personal values to be invoked or may be interpreted within the confines of professional conduct. "Guided by the precept that when members fulfill their responsibility to the public, clients' and employers' interests are best served" gives ambiguous guidance to an individual in a situation where there is conflict between the responsibility to the client and the public.
Lack of the attributes of clarity, precision, and univocity may also be the source of the potential different readings of Rule 203. It should be noted in the terminology of Rule 203 that if the financial statements would otherwise be misleading, "the member can comply with the rule" by describing and justifying the departure. Emphasis has been added to the word can because of the selection of that word. The rule does not say must but rather can. While a lay person may in this context not distinguish between the words "can" and "must", to a professional that difference is important. Taking exception to GAAP is not mandated by the rule but rather is allowed by the rule. The burden is thus placed on the individual professional to take exception to the body of authoritative literature because he or she has determined that compliance would be misleading but the professional must act without the mandate of the profession.
Epstein and Spaulding, in their analysis of Rule 203, suggest that the statement could be formulated as follows:
a. IF there are "unusual circumstances," and
b. IF those unusual circumstances call for a departure from GAAP to avoid a misleading financial statement,
c. THEN a departure, with explanation, is appropriate." (p. 247)
The "if . . . then" formulation would have increased the clarity, precision, and univocity of the rule.
Conclusions based on analysis
When faced with a situation then where a client desires that financial disclosure be made in compliance with GAAP but the auditor has some concern about the trustworthiness of the resulting disclosure, the auditor is confronted with a dilemma between responsibility to the client and responsibility to the public. To the extent the auditor, the client, or the public seeks guidance in the AICPA's Code of Conduct to determine proper behavior, the Code may communicate a different prioritization of auditor responsibility to different audiences with the public finding support for the priority of public interest over client interest but with the client and the professional finding little support for that concept. Further the public may perceive the auditing professional as being responsible for trustworthy information while the client and the professional may view responsibility more in terms of rule compliance.
If the intent of the AICPA's Code of Conduct is to prevent the expectations gap by either of the means expected under a utopian fundamentalist method, the attempt failed. There is little evidence to support the viewpoint that the Public Interest principle was added or that Rule 203 is written to ensure that the moral foundations of the profession are consistent with the expectations of the public. Instead, the Code contains semantic defects which cause it to communicate differently to the public and to professionals.
It has been noted by Epstein and Spaulding that a bias toward the client exists when the accounting professional is confronted with the public/client dilemma.
Despite the accounting profession's Code of Professional Conduct, which places the public's interest ahead of the accountant's interests, the resolution of conflicts between an accountant's client on one hand, and the general public, on the other, is usually balanced in favor of the client. (p. 271)
While Epstein and Spaulding conclude that the bias results despite the Code, semiotic virtues analysis identifies semantic defects which would indicate that the Code sanctions and perhaps contributes to the bias.
In his analysis of the potential outcome of a public/client dilemma, McDowell (1991) concluded that the biasing which results is subtle in that ". . . the more difficult and pervasive choices are not in outright lying . . ., but rather the slanting or shadowing of the truth ...." (p. 7) It is this "slanting or shadowing of the truth". whether real or perceived, that lies at the heart of the expectation gap in accounting.
If the public perceives, whether correctly or not, that the professional has allowed information to be presented which has slanted or shadowed the truth so as to render it less than trust worthy, the expectations of the public have not been met and there is the potential for a loss of trust in the profession. This is of critical importance to the auditing profession because confidence in professional judgement is all the profession adds to the reporting process. At some point the less of trust would result in the loss of legitimacy of the audit function.
Without asserting that the intent of the changes made in the Code in 1988 was for public relations purposes, the changes made most clearly fir the pattern of change for public relations purposes. The placement of the commitment to the public interest in the Principles section communicates to the public a level of support for the concept which is not communicated to the professional because of the lack of enforceability of the Principles and the resulting difference between implicit and explicit duties. Further, the public is more likely to base its perceptions on the statement of Principles while the professional is likely to emphasize interpretations of the Principles. Thus, the change in Principles can be perceived as likely to communicate differently to the parties.
Likewise, the wording of Rule 203 gives the appearance of making GAAP exception statements far more likely than they are because the Rule doesn't contain a mandate for disclosure but, rather, places the burden of proof on the individual professional. This makes practitioner application of the rule very difficult and unlikely. These semantic defects which allow different audiences to read different meanings into the Code could have been avoided and could still be corrected.
In contrast, the semantic defects associated with the presuppositions of the Code relate more to systemic issues of the accounting profession. Correction of these defects would require the profession to place more emphasis on public interest instead of self-protection at the institutional level and self-promotion at the individual level.
Implications of analysis
The implications of the above analysis depend somewhat upon the sociological model to which one subscribes. If one has a functionalist world view, the AICPA Code of Conduct can be viewed as having semantic defects which the profession can and should work toward correcting. The Code is thus viewed as the basis of dialogue and subject to ongoing revision. In order to move toward the utopian world view, fundamental changes in professional education may be needed such that current and future professional are educated in the direction of values instead of rules.
In contrast, from a conflict view the AICPA Code of Conduct is just the self-serving document one would expect from a profession. The semantic defects are seen as intentional features designed to serve the self-interest of professionals. Furthermore, according to this view, future changes in the Code may give the appearance of correcting defects while in reality the changes will merely be efforts to prolong the duping of the public.
As depicted in this paper, the functionalist and conflict views are largely tautological extremes. This was done for illustrative purposes and to facilitate analysis of the AICPA Code. More likely than either of these extremes is that the profession is populated by a variety of individuals in terms of their orientation toward forthrightness and a service ideal or toward deception and self-interest. From this view, the semantic defects of the Code can be seen as an important battleground between the public interest and the private interests of those members of the profession who are self-serving.
According tho functionalist view of Parsons (1954), the public interest can be protected through the expectations created by the institutional framework of a profession. Parsons, thus, does not emphasize virtues as necessary for professions to fulfill a service ideal. Instead, he feels that self-interested professionals may fulfill the service ideal in the proper institutional environment. Kultgen (1988), in contrast, seems to emphasize the personal characteristics of professionals when he states, "(p)rofessions need to be reformed so that they will populate themselves with more members who consistently put the ideal ahead of other considerations." (p. 361) In either case, it seems that reform of the AICPA Code of Conduct is needed. Perhaps by addressing the semantic defects in the Code, the accounting profession can move toward a more functionalist conception of what was meant by the word profession.
Notes
1 It is necessary to put boundaries on the discussion that follows. It is common to assume that the
accounting can be discussed as a profession defined by a singular role. In the discussion which follows, it will be assumed that the role being discussed is that of an auditor. While it is possible that most of the discussion which follows could be extended to nonaudit aspects of the profession, it unnecessarily complicates the discussion.
Rule 301 makes several exceptions to the confidentiality rule including not only Rule 203 but also Rule 202, compliance with a subpoena or summons, a review of a member's professional practice by an appropriate professional body, or in initiating a complaint or responding to an inquiry by an investigative or disciplinary body. Only the Rule 203 exception is relevant to the current analysis.
3 See Epstein and Spaulding pp. 126-127 for an extended
discussion of the different views and support for the "clean bill of health"
assumption.
| References |
| American Institute of Certified Public Accountants: 1988, Code of Conduct
(AICPA, New York). Daniels, A. K.: 1973, `How Free Should Professions Be?',
in Professions and Prospects (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills/London).
Epstein, M. J. and A. D. Spaulding: 1993, The Accountant's Guide to Legal Liability and Ethics (Irwin, Homewood, Illinois). Hauptman, R. and F. Hill: 1991, `Deride, Abide or |
| Dissent: On the Ethics of Professional Conduct', Journal of Business
Ethics 10, 37-44. Johnson, Terence: 1972, Professionalism and Power (The
MacMillan Press, London).
Kemper, T. D.: 1976, `Marxist and Functionalist Theories in the Study of Stratification: Common Elements that Lead to a Test', Social Forces 54, 559-578. Kultgen, J.: 1988, Ethics and Professionalism (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia). Kultgen, J.: 1983, `The Ideological Use of Professional Codes', Business and Professional Ethics Journal 1(3), 53-69. Larson, M. S.: 1977, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (University of California Press, Berkley). McDowell, B.: 1991, Ethical Conduct and the Professional's Dilemma: Choosing Between Service and Success (Quorum Books, New York). Newton, L.: 1982, `The Origin of Professionalism: Sociological Conclusions and Ethical Implications', Business and Professional Ethics Journal 1(4), 33-43. Parsons, Talcott: 1954, `The Professions and Social Structure', Essays in Sociological Theory (The Free Press, Glencoe, IL). Ruland, R. and C. Lindblom: 1992, `Ethics and Disclosure: An Analysis of Conflicting Duties', Critical Perspectives on Accounting 3, 259-272. |
| Cristi K. Lindblom is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at Babson
College in Wellesley, Massachusetts. She holds a Ph. D and is a Certified
Management Accountant. She has made numerous professional presentations
and is co-author with Robert G. Ruland of "Ehtics and Disclosure: An Analysis
of Conflicting Duties", Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 1992. In addition
to accounting ethics, Cristi's research interests include social disclosure
and organizational legitimacy.
Robert G. Ruland is an Associate Professor of Accounting at Suffolk University. He holds a Ph.D and is a Certified Public Accountant. Robert has made numerous professional presentations on ethics in accounting and has published in a variety of journals including the Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Research on Accounting Ethics, and Critical Perspectives on Accounting. He is the 1994-95 chair of the Professionalism and Ethics Committee of the American Accounting Association. |